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Abstract
This paper has a two-folded purpose. First, we attempt to out-
line the development of the turnpike theorems in the the last several
decades. Second, we study turnpike theorems in finite-horizon two-
person zero-sum Markov games on a general Borel state space. Utilis-
ing the Bellman (or Shapley) operator defined for this game, we prove
the stochastic versions of the early turnpike theorem on the set of op-
timal strategies and the middle turnpike theorem on the distribution
of the state space.
Key Words and Phrases: Markov games, general Borel state space, turn-
pike theorem, average cost, turnpike on strategies, turnpike on the distribu-
tion of states, middle turnpike, early turnpike
1 Introduction
Turnpike theorems are a set of economic theorems on optimal control prob-
lems, which characterise solutions (optimal paths) of optimal control prob-
lems and focus on the stationary optimal one. The turnpike theorem was
first proposed by Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow in [27] within the context
of an optimal growth model. In the literature, there are extensive work on
the turnpike theorems in many diversified settings of optimal control prob-
lems and games, ranging from discrete time to continuous time, from the
deterministic case to the stochastic case, with or without discounting. There
is no clear-cut and unified classification for turnpike theorems. For exam-
ple, McKenzie [67] distinguished three kinds of turnpikes: the early, late and
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middle turnpikes, but in [71], he used a different classification scheme with
the Samuelson and Ramsey turnpike. We think that this is helpful to clar-
ify different types of turnpike theorems and to give a clear picture on the
state of this subject. Hence we start this paper with a survey on the main
developments of the turnpike theorems in the last several decades.
Further on, in this paper, we study turnpike theorems in finite-horizon
zero-sum Markov games on a general Borel state space following the approach
developed in [50] in which a finite state space was considered. A general
approach to Borel state space stochastic games was developed by Maitra
and Sudderth [65]. They proved the existence of the game value for general
universally measurable strategies. However, the optimal strategies need not
exist in their games and it is assumed the transition probability function is
strongly continuous in the actions of one player.
In our setting, under the weaker assumption (4.1) in Section 4, we show
the convergence of the long time average cost (reward) of the game and prove
the turnpike theorems on the set of strategies and on the distribution of the
states.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we sketch a
picture of turnpike theory showing how the theory was developed. In Section
3, we present the basic setting for a two-person zero-sum Markov game and
define the Bellman (or Shapley) operator. The main results will be presented
and proved in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper and proposes further
research.
2 Recent development in the turnpike theory
In this section, we outline the development of the turnpike theory in the last
several decades. We shall start with turnpike theorems in the deterministic
setting, followed by the stochastic analog of the turnpike theorems.
2.1 The turnpike theorems in the deterministic setting
For the turnpike theorems in the deterministic setting, it is important to dis-
tinguish the asymptotic and neighborhood turnpike theorems for solutions to
discounted infinite-horizon optimal control problems from the classical turn-
pike theorems for solutions to undiscounted finite-horizon problems. Some
surveys in the deterministic setting can be also found in [71, 94, 7, 48].
2
The classical turnpike theorem considers a deterministic finite-horizon
(T > 0) optimal control problem on a given state space X . In a discrete
time case, the problem is{
maximise
∑T−1
t=0 L(xt, xt+1)
subject to x0, xT ∈ X given, {xt}
T
t=0 ⊂ X
(2.1)
with a cost (utility) function L : X2 → R, T ∈ N. In a continuous time case,
the problem is

maximise
∫ T
0
L(xt, ut)dt
subject to x˙t = h(xt, ut), ut ∈ U
x0, xT ∈ X given, {xt}t∈[0,T ] ⊂ X
(2.2)
with a cost (utility) function L : X × U → R, where h : X × U → R
is a continuous mapping with respect to both arguments, U is the set of
admissible controls and T ∈ R+. The initial value x0 and the terminal value
xT are held fixed. Let x
∗ denote a solution of the maximization problem
maximise L(x, x), x ∈ X.
The path x∗ := {xt : xt = x
∗, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]} is called a stationary optimal path.
Often, the uniqueness of the stationary optimal path is assumed.
In the case where the terminal value xT is not given, an additional term,
interpreted as the terminal payoff function, should be added to the above
problems. That is, the optimal problem is, in a discrete time setting{
maximise
∑T−1
t=0 L(xt, xt+1) + S(xT )
subject to x0 given, {xt}
T
t=0 ⊂ X
(2.3)
and, in a continuous time case

maximise
∫ T
0
L(xt, ut)dt+ S(xT )
subject to x˙t = h(xt, ut), ut ∈ U
x0 given, {xt}t∈[0,T ] ⊂ X
(2.4)
where the terminal payoff function S : X → R.
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The original formulation of the continuous time problem (2.2) is ascribed
to Samuelson-Solow [82] and the discrete time problem (2.1) to Gale [32] and
Mckenzie [78, 67]. It was further investigated by e.g. Radner [80], Morishima
[77], McKenzie [66] and Makarov and Rubinov [64], Atsumi [1] and Haurie
[35]. Mckenzie [71] discussed in detail the development of the turnpike the-
ory in both the von Neumann growth model and the Ramsey’s growth model
and specified a classification of Samuelson turnpike and Ramsey turnpike.
The classical techniques which were developed to prove the classical turn-
pike theorems are critically dependent on the convexity of the control set
U and technology function h and the preference function L. These classi-
cal techniques fall into two classes: Value-Loss methods and Monotonicity
method, see more discussion in [45].
The classical turnpike theorem states that if T is large enough, the optimal
path {x∗t} that transfers the system from x0 to xT approaches the unique
optimal stationary level x∗, and stays close to it for a large fraction of T , and
moves away toward the terminal state only in the final periods; that is, for
each ǫ > 0, there exist an integer T0 such that for each T ≥ 2T0,
||x∗t − x
∗|| ≤ ǫ, ∀t ∈ [T0, T − T0]. (2.5)
This is called the middle turnpike theorem in [67]. Moreover, if this result
holds for any initial value x0 ∈ X , it is the global version; if the result holds
for some initial value x0 which is near enough to x
∗, it is the local version, e.g.
[9]. Further, if for each ǫ > 0, there exists an integer T0 and a number δ > 0
such that ||x0 − x
∗|| ≤ δ implies (2.5) for all t ∈ [0, T − T0] with T ≥ 2T0,
this was called the early turnpike theorem in [67]. Since this image resembles
a map of an intercity highway or turnpike with entrance and exit ramps, a
stationary optimal path x∗ is often referred to as a turnpike.
A version of the classical turnpike theorem for games was also presented.
For example, two-player zero-sum differential games were studied by Za-
slavski [91], showing that there exists a pair of optimal stationary paths x∗
and y∗ for the two players and presenting a version of classical middle turn-
pike theorem, and by Alvarez and Bardi [3, 2, 8], proving a turnpike theorem
for the value of the game.
In the classical setting, the state space X was often a compact, convex,
bounded and closed subset of a finite-dimensional space; the cost (utility)
function L is often continuous, smooth and strictly concave (or convex);
hence the turnpike theorem was proved by the concavity analysis. Later,
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under upper (lower) semicontinuity, some extensions to general Banach state
spaces were obtained by e.g. Kolokoltsov [50], Yakovenko and L.A. Kontorer
[88], Zaslavski [90, 92, 93], Mamedov [59].
When the future is discounted, the deterministic optimal control problem
with infinite-horizon is described, in a discrete-time setting as{
maximise
∑∞
t=0 δ
tL(xt, xt+1)
subject to x0 ∈ X, {xt}
∞
t=0 ⊂ X
(2.6)
and in a continuous-time setting as

maximise
∫∞
0
e−ρtL(xt, ut)dt
subject to x˙t = h(xt, ut), ut ∈ U
x0 ∈ X, {xt}t≥0 ⊂ X
(2.7)
with a discount factor 0 < δ ≤ 1 and a discount rate ρ ≥ 0. The case
where δ = 1 and ρ = 0 is referred to as the undiscounted version of the
problem (2.6) and (2.7). The asymptotic behaviour of the optimal path in
the discounted framework depends critically on the magnitude of the initial
stock and the discount factor.
Two classes of turnpike theorems should be distinguished when the future
is discounted. The first class is the asymptotic turnpike theorem, see e.g. in
Scheinkman [85], Bewley [6] , Yano [87], Carlson[15], Carlson, Haurie and
Jabrane [14], Zaslavski [89], Park [79]. It states that there exists a discount
factor δ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for x0 ∈ X and any δ ∈ [δ
′, 1), the optimal path
{x∗t} starting at x0 converges to the stationary path x
∗.
The asymptotic turnpike theorem was proved under strictly concavity
assumptions on L by e.g. Scheinkman [85] and Bewley [6], Majumdar, Ner-
muth [63], Kamihigashi and Roy [47]. Majumdar and Mitra [61] interpreted
the function L as the consumption and set L(xt, xt+1) := f(xt)−xt+1 > 0 for
all t and considered a nonconvex (convex-concave) technology function f , i.e.
f is assumed to be strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable
such that f satisfies f ′(∞) < 1 < f ′(0) < ∞ and there is a real number
k1 > 0 such that f
′′(x) = 0 for x = k1, f
′′(x) > 0 for 0 ≤ x < k1 and
f ′′(x) < 0 for x > k1.
Montrucchio [72, 73] assumed certain curvature restrictions, i.e. the func-
tion L is continuous and strongly (α, β)-concave, i.e. L(x, y) + 1
2
α|x|2 +
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2
β|y|2 is concave with α + β > 0 and that the value function W (x0) :=
max
∑∞
t=0 δ
tL(xt, xt+1) is concave-γ for all δ ∈ (δ0, 1), i.e. W (x) +
1
2
γ|x|2 is
convex for all δ ∈ (δ0, 1). He proved that there exists δ
′ = 1− α+β
γ
such that
for a discount factor δ ∈ (max[δ0, 1 −
α+β
γ
], 1) the local asymptotic turnpike
theorem holds, where α + β is a measure of the lower curvature of L and γ
is a measure of its upper curvature. Carlso and Haurie [16] proved a version
of the asymptotic turnpike theorem for infinite horizon open-loop differen-
tial games with δ = 1 under a “strict diagonal concavity condition” on L.
An uniform asymptotic turnpike theorem was proved by Cuong LeVan and
Lisa Morhaim [58] under similar assumptions, i.e. if the function L(x, y) is
a strictly concave function, increasing in x and decreasing in y, then for any
initial point x0 ∈ X , there exists a β
′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any β ∈ [β ′, 1),
the asymptotic turnpike property holds.
Araujo and Scheinkman [5], McKenzie [68], Dasgupta and Mckenzie [21]
and Hyun Park [79] applied the implicit function theorem to prove the asymp-
totic turnpike theorem by assuming a dominant diagonal blocks condition:
for an infinite matrix D formed by n× n blocks Dij , i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . }, Dii is
invertible, supi |D
−1
ii | < ∞ and supi
∑∞
j=1,i 6=j |D
−1
ii Dij| < 1, where the norm
|Dij| = sup|z|=1 |Dijz|.
The second class is the neighborhood turnpike theorem, see e.g. [13, 69,
87, 18, 70, 28, 62, 47]. It states that for any ǫ > 0, there exists T ′ > 0 and
δ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that, an optimal path stating from x0 at the discount factor
δ ∈ (δ′, 1) eventually stays within the ǫ-neighborhood of a stationary path
x∗, i.e.
||x∗t − x
∗|| ≤ ǫ, ∀t ≥ T ′.
If a smaller neighborhood ǫ is chosen, the closer the discount factor δ is to 1.
To prove the neighborhood turnpike theorem, e.g. in Mckenzie [70], Yano
[87], instead of strictly concavity assumption, the differentiability of the func-
tion L is required. A version of uniform neighborhood turnpike theorem was
proved in Guerrero-Luchtenberg and Leonardo [57]. It states that, under
certain differentiability and concavity conditions on L, the neighborhood
turnpike theorem holds for almost all initial states.
Finite-horizon problem with discounting was examined in e.g. [30, 28].
Based on convexity condition and using Implicit Programming formulation,
Feinstein and Oren [30] proved a funnel asymptotic turnpike theorem, namely,
an optimal path lies in an exponentially bounded region (determined by the
discount factor) of the optimal stationary path. Fershtman and Kamien [28]
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considered a finite-horizon differential games with quadratic cost function
and proved a neighborhood turnpike theorem for the feedback equilibrium
strategies.
2.2 The stochastic version of turnpike theorems
The turnpike theorems under uncertainty was first developed by William and
Mirman [10]. The uncertainty or the stochastic environment is represented
by a filtered probability space (Ω,F , ν; {Ft}t≥0), ω ∈ Ω is a possible state
of the environment, F is the Borel σ-field, ν is a probability measure on
Ω, {Ft}t≥0 is the filtration satisfying the “usual” conditions, i.e. it is right-
continuous and complete. The underlying evolution of the states {xt} is a
stochastic process on (Ω,F , ν). Then the stochastic optimal control problem,
in the undiscounted case, can be described, in the discrete-time setting as
maximise E
[
T∑
t=0
L(xt, ut)
]
(2.8)
and in the continuous-time setting as
maximise E
[∫ T
0
L(xt, ut)dt
]
(2.9)
subject to the constraint (xt, ut) ∈ X × U with the initial condition x0 ∈ X
and the terminal condition x|t=T = xT ∈ X with probability 1. Here, in
general, x0 is an F0-measurable random variable and xT is an FT -measurable
random variable. An optimal path (x∗t , u
∗
t ) is an Ft-adapted process such that
(2.8) or (2.9) is achieved.
In the case where the terminal value is not given and a terminal payoff
function S is considered, the problems can be reformulated as
maximise E
[
T∑
t=0
L(xt, ut) + S(xT )
]
(2.10)
and
maximise E
[∫ T
0
L(xt, ut)dt+ S(xT )
]
(2.11)
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Further, when the future is discounted, the problem is described, in the
discrete-time setting as
maximise E
[
T∑
t=0
δtL(xt, ut)
]
(2.12)
and in the continuous-time setting as
maximise E
[∫ T
0
e−ρtL(xt, ut)dt
]
. (2.13)
The stochastic analog of the turnpike theorem states that the optimal
paths converge in a stochastic sense (say, convergence in distribution, con-
vergence in probability or almost surely convergence) to a unique stochastic
limit under standard assumptions of differentiability and concavity of the
function L. The proof was mostly based on dynamic programming principle.
The most studied stochastic version of the middle turnpike theorem states
that for any ǫ > 0, there exists a number θ > 0 such that the expected number
of time periods for which {x∗t} spends outside the ǫ-neighbourhood of x
∗, i.e.
||x∗t − x
∗|| > ǫ, is bounded from above by θ, where θ is independent of T .
The uniformity assumption and the sensitivity assumption were mostly
used to prove the stochastic version of turnpike theorems, as discussed in
Joshi [46]. The idea is first to construct a value-loss process, say {Vt : t ≥ 0}
which has the convenient property of being either a martingale (Majumdar
and Zilcha [76]), a submartingale (Brock and Majumdar [12] or a super-
martingale (Joshi [45]) thereby permitting a passage to the rich theory of
martingales. Then the process {Vt : t ≥ 0} is assumed to be uniform bounded
in expectation (i.e. the uniformity assumption) and have certain sensitivity
property (i.e. the sensitivity assumption). The sensitivity assumption of
{Vt : t ≥ 0} says that, for any ǫ > 0, if the optimal paths diverge from the
stochastic limit by more than ǫ, then the process {Vt} records a value-loss of
at least η(ǫ) > 0. In other words, value-loss should be sensitive to a critical
divergence of the optimal paths.
For general Markov chains the question on the existence of optimal value
for discounted prices wwas addressed in [38]. Turnpike theorems for Markov
chains were proved by Shapiro [83] in discounted case and by Kolokoltsov
[49] without discounting. In the latter paper the turnpike theorems on the
strategies and on the distributions of states were distinguished.
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For the financial portfolio problems, the turnpike theorems was proved,
mainly under convexity conditions on the function L directly, e.g. by Mossin
[78], Leland [56], Hakansson [34], Hakansson [34], Sumit Joshi [45], Cox and
Huang [19] and Huang and Zariphopoulou [40], Dybvig, Rogers and Back
Kerry [24]. In the discrete-time setting, Mossin [78] showed the convergence
of optimal strategies under the assumption that − L
′(x)
L′′(x)
= ax + b, where L′
and L′′ is the first and second order derivative of L, respectively. Leland
[56] generalised Mossin’s result by assuming that − L
′(x)
L′′(x)
= ax + h(b) where
the function h is uniformly bounded. Hakansson [34] proved convergence of
optimal strategies by making assumptions slightly more general (x−a)
1−b
1−b
≤
L(x) ≤ (x−a)
1−b
1−b
, ∀x ≥ a. Huberman and Ross [41] showed that convergence
occurs for the functions L that are bounded from below and for some c ∈
(0, 1), limx→∞
−L′′(x)x
L′(x)
= c.
In the continuous-time setting, Cox and Huang [19] demonstrate that the
portfolio turnpike property holds if the utility function L is strictly concave
with limx→∞ L
′(x) = 0 and there exists A1, A2, b > 0 and K > 0 such
that |(L′)−1(x) − A1x
− 1
b | ≤ A2x
−a, for all x ≤ K and some a ∈ [0, 1
b
),
where (L′)−1 denotes the inverse of L′. Huang and Zariphopoulou [40] gave
another sufficient condition for the turnpike property that the strictly concave
function L satisfies the condition limx→∞
L′(x)
xr−1
= k for 0 < r < 1 and k > 0.
In optimal growth theory, mainly under the uniformity assumption and
the sensitivity assumption, in the undiscounted case, Brock and Mirman
[11], Dana [20], Evstigneev [25, 26, 4] and Mirman and Zilcha [75] showed
that all optimal paths converge in an appropriate topology to the optimal
stationary path. In the discounted context, Brock and Mirman [10] and
Mirman and Zilcha [74] proved the convergence in distribution of optimal
paths from distinct initial stocks to the stationary optimal paths. Fleming,
Sethi and Soner [31] studied production planning problem where the demand
is described as a Markov chain and showed a turnpike theorem for the Markov
control.
Some research considered a so-called non-stationary setting. The stochas-
tic environment can be non-stationary, namely, Ω := X∞t=0Ωt and is consid-
ered as the set of all sequences ω := {ωt : ωt ∈ Ωt, t ≥ 0}, where ωt is a
possible state of the environment at time t. If the function L depends addi-
tionally on time t, it is called time-varying or non-stationary preference. In
non-stationary models, the convergence in probability (Brock and Majum-
dar [12]) and the stronger property of almost sure convergence (Chang [17],
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Fo¨llmer and Majumda [29], Joshi [45], Majumdar and Zilcha [76], Joshi [46])
were proved. Denardo and Rothblum [22] considered an exponential utility
function L for a Markov decision process and proved that if the corresponding
transition rate matrix is transient, there exits an optimal stationary control
path u∗.
In game theory, turnpike theorems for long-time two-player zero-sum
stochastic games on a finite state space were proved by e.g. Kolokoltsov
[50], Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev[51], by utilising the Bellman (or Shapley)
operator and imposing conditions on the transition probability. Related re-
search on long-time two-player zero-sum stochastic games can be founded e.g.
in Sorin [84], Herna´ndez-Lerma and Lasserre [37] , Guo and Hernndez-Lerma
[33].
Haurie and Delft [36] considered a dynamics games with piecewise deter-
ministic path and random jumps. In the discounted setting, under the as-
sumption of convexity and piecewise uniqueness, the global asymptotic was
proved if the transition probability qij are constant and the local asymptotic
was proved if qij are state and control dependent.
For zero-sum Markov games, Jas´kiewicz [42], Vega-Amaya [86] worked
with strongly continuous transition probabilities, i.e. the transition prob-
ability q(D|x, u, v) is continuous in actions u and v, for any fixed states x
and Borel subset D of the state space X . It was proved that the optimality
equation has a solution, there exists a value of the game and both players
possess optimal stationary strategies. In the proof, Jas´kiewicz [42] analyzes
auxiliary perturbed models, whereas Vega-Amaya [86] makes use of a fixed
point theorem.
In the work of Jas´kiewicz and Nowak [44] and Ku¨enle [55], zero-sum
Markov games within the similar setting where the transition times occur at
integer time moments were studied. Jas´kiewicz and Nowak [44] prove the
similar results by applying Fatou’s Lemma for weakly convergent measures.
Ku¨enle [55] introduced certain contraction operators which lead to a param-
eterized family of functional equations. Making use of some continuity and
monotonicity properties of the solutions to these equations (with respect to
the parameter) he obtains a lower semicontinuous solution of the optimal-
ity equation. Then he showed that the maximzing player has an ǫ-optimal
stationary strategy, and the minimizing player has an optimal stationary
strategy.
Jas´kiewicz [43] studied a zero-sum ergodic semi-Markov games, in a gen-
eral Borel state space, with weakly continuous (Feller) transition probabil-
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ities and lower semicontinuous payoff function L. Under the Banach fixed
point theorem and an ergodicity assumption of an embedded Markov chain,
it was proved that in this game, one player possesses an ǫ-optimal stationary
strategy and the other has an optimal stationary strategy.
Beyond the uniqueness assumption on the turnpike, it is worth noting that
if there are several optimal stationary paths, there exists a state transition
of the optimal paths from one optimal stationary path to another, see e.g.
Mamedov [60], Alain Rapaprot and Pierre Cartigny [81], Kamihigashi and
Roy [47].
3 Basic setting for a zero-sum Markov game
In this section, we shall set up a model for a discrete-time two-person zero-
sum Markov game on a general Borel state space. A Bellman (or Shap-
ley)operator is defined for this game and some basic properties of this oper-
ator are discussed.
A discrete-time two-person zero-sum T -step, T ∈ N, Markov game is a
tuple (X, π, U, V, P, g, S) of the following meanings:
• X is a Borel subset of a general complete metric state space endowed
with its Borel σ-field B(X) and a Borel σ-finite reference measure π on it.
One can always keep in mind the sets {1, · · · , n} and N with arbitrary discrete
measure or a subset of Rd with Lebesgue measure as basic examples of X
with its reference measure π.
• U and V are compact spaces of the admissible strategies (i.e., control
parameters) for player 1 and player 2, respectively.
• P = {P (u, v, x, ·), x ∈ X, u ∈ U, v ∈ V } is the family of transition
probability kernels, i.e. P (u, v, x, A), A ∈ B(X), is the transition probability
from state x to A if the two players choose strategies u and v respectively. We
assume that the transition probability P (u, v, x, ·) has a density ρ(u, v, x, y)
with respect to the reference measure π(·).
• g : U×V ×X×X 7→ R is a transition cost function for player 1, namely,
g(u, v, x, y) is the cost of the player 1 (i.e., the income of the player 2) from
the transition from x to y under controls u and v. If the cost g(u, v, x, y) is
negative, this means that the player 2 pays |g(u, v, x, y)| to player 1. The
function g is assumed to be continuous and also bounded by certain constant
G > 0, uniformly in u, v, x, y, i.e.
|g(u, v, x, y)| ≤ G, ∀u, v, x, y.
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• S : X 7→ R is a final cost function depending on the final position. The
function S is assumed to be bounded and continuous. We denote the set of
bounded and continuous functions on X by Cb(X).
The dynamic T -step game with a given initial position x ∈ X is played
as follows. At the first step, starting from the given initial state x, the
players choose sequentially certain strategies v ∈ V and then u ∈ U and
the game moves to the next state y ∈ X with probability ρ(u, v, x, y)π(dy).
Then the player 1 pays g(u, v, x, y) to player 2 if g(u, v, x, y) is positive;
otherwise, the player 2 pays |g(u, v, x, y)| to player 1. The second step is
played analogously starting from the new position y. After T steps, the
player 2 receives additional payment S(k) depending on the finial position
k ∈ X . In this multi-step game, the player 1 aims to minimise the payoff to
player 2.
We define the Bellman operator B : Cb(X) 7→ Cb(X) by
(BS)(x) := inf
u
sup
v
[∫
X
(
g(u, v, x, y) + S(y)
)
ρ(u, v, x, y)π(dy)
]
. (3.1)
Then, according to the dynamic programming principle, the solution to the
T -step Markov game is given by the iterations BTS. We would like to men-
tion that, since the transition cost function g and the final cost function S
are assumed to be bounded and continuous, the inf sup in the definition (3.2)
can be replaced by minmax. Namely, in our setting, the Bellman operator
B can be written as
(BS)(x) = min
u
max
v
[∫
X
(
g(u, v, x, y) + S(y)
)
ρ(u, v, x, y)π(dy)
]
. (3.2)
Remark 3.1. It is often assumed that the game defined by (3.2) has a value,
which means that inf sup are interchangeable for all S ∈ Cb(X) such that one
also has
(BS)(x) = sup
v
inf
u
[∫
X
(
g(u, v, x, y) + S(y)
)
ρ(u, v, x, y)π(dy)
]
.
But we shall not make or use this assumption. Hence, in our framework,
BT describes the payoff for the player 1 calculated for the worst scenario
dynamics (sometimes called robust control).
It is clear that, for any constant a ∈ R and any function S ∈ Cb(X), the
Bellman operator satisfies the following homogeneity property
B(a+ S) = a +BS. (3.3)
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Moreover, the Bellman operator B is non-expansive in the usual sup-norm,
i.e.
||BS1 − BS2|| ≤ ||S1 − S2||, ∀S1, S2 ∈ Cb(X) (3.4)
since the inequality
||BS1 −BS2|| = sup
x∈X
|(BS1 − BS2)(x)|
≤ sup
x∈X
sup
u,v
∫
X
|(S1(y)− S2(y))| ρ(u, v, x, y)π(dy)
≤||S1 − S2||
holds for any S1, S2 ∈ Cb(X).
With the homogeneity property (3.3) and the non-expansive property
(3.4) of the Bellman operator B, we can define the quotient space C˜b(X) of
Cb(X) with respect to constant functions. Namely, the equivalence classes
are defined by
[S] := {S + a, ∀a ∈ R : S ∈ Cb(X)}.
Let Π : Cb(X) 7→ C˜b(X) be the natural projection. The quotient norm on
C˜b(X) is defined by the formula
||Π(f)|| = inf
a∈R
||f + a|| =
1
2
(
sup
x∈X
f(x)− inf
x∈X
f(x)
)
. (3.5)
It is clear that Π has a unique isometric right inverse mapping Φ : C˜b(X) 7→
Cb(X) so that Π ◦ Φ is an identity in C˜b(X). The image Φ(C˜b(X)) consists
of all functions S ∈ Cb(X) such that
sup
x∈X
S(x) = − inf
x∈X
S(x).
Thus one can identify S˜ ∈ C˜b(X) with its image S = Φ(S˜) ∈ Cb(X). By the
properties (3.3) and (3.4), the continuous quotient map B˜ : C˜b(X) 7→ C˜b(X)
is well defined.
4 Main results
In this section, we shall present the turnpike theorems for the game specified
above. First, the uniqueness of the average cost and the stationary strategy
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are proved. Then, the turnpike theorems on the set of strategies and on the
state space are proved.
To state the main results, we need some additional properties of the
transition probabilities:
∃δ > 0 : ∃A ∈ B(X) with π(A) > 0 : ∀x ∈ X, ∀u ∈ U, ∀v ∈ V, ∀y ∈ A,
ρ(u, v, x, y) ≥ δ.
(4.1)
First, we show that the operator B˜ is a contraction in the following
Lemma 4.1. If the property (4.1) holds, then
||B˜(S˜1)− B˜(S˜2)|| ≤ (1− δπ(A))||S˜1 − S˜2|| ∀S˜1, S˜2 ∈ C˜b(X). (4.2)
Proof. For arbitrary S1, S2 ∈ Cb(X) and arbitrary states x, z ∈ X ,
(BS1 − BS2)(x)− (BS1 − BS2)(z)
≤max
u,v
∫
X
(S1(y)− S2(y))ρ(u, v, x, y)π(dy)
−min
u,v
∫
X
(S1(y)− S2(y))ρ(u, v, z, y)π(dy).
Denote
(u1, v1) = argmax
u,v
∫
X
(S1(y)− S2(y))ρ(u, v, x, y)π(dy)
and
(u2, v2) = argmin
u,v
∫
X
(S1(y)− S2(y))ρ(u, v, z, y)π(dy).
Then, we have
(BS1 − BS2)(x)− (BS1 −BS2)(z)
≤
∫
X
(S1(y)− S2(y))
(
ρ(u1, v1, x, y)− ρ(u2, v2, z, y)
)
π(dy)
≤||S1 − S2||
∫
X
|ρ(u1, v1, x, y)− ρ(u2, v2, z, y)|π(dy).
(4.3)
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By property (4.1), for all y ∈ A,
ρ(u1, v1, x, y) ≥ δ, and ρ(u2, v2, z, y) ≥ δ.
Then ∫
X
|ρ(u1, v1, x, y)− ρ(u2, v2, z, y)|π(dy)
≤
∫
X\A
(
ρ(u1, v1, x, y) + ρ(u2, v2, z, y)
)
π(dy)
+
∫
A
∣∣∣ρ(u1, v1, x, y)− ρ(u2, v2, z, y)∣∣∣π(dy)
=1−
∫
A
ρ(u1, v1, x, y)π(dy) + 1−
∫
A
ρ(u2, v2, z, y)π(dy)
+
∫
A
∣∣ρ(u1, v1, x, y)− ρ(u2, v2, z, y)∣∣π(dy).
Denote by A+ the set of y ∈ A such that
ρ(u1, v1, x, y) > ρ(u2, v2, z, y)
and by A− the set of y ∈ A such that
ρ(u1, v1, x, y) ≤ ρ(u2, v2, z, y).
Clearly, A+ ∩A− = ∅ and A+ ∪A− = A, so∫
X
|ρ(u1, v1, x, y)− ρ(u2, v2, z, y)|π(dy)
≤2−
∫
A+∪A−
ρ(u1, v1, x, y)π(dy)−
∫
A+∪A−
ρ(u2, v2, z, y)π(dy)
+
∫
A+
(ρ(u1, v1, x, y)− ρ(u2, v2, z, y))π(dy)
+
∫
A−
(ρ(u2, v2, z, y)− ρ(u1, v1, x, y))π(dy)
=2− 2
∫
A+
ρ(u2, v2, z, y)π(dy)− 2
∫
A−
ρ(u1, v1, x, y)π(dy)
≤2− 2δπ(A+)− 2δπ(A−)
=2− 2δπ(A).
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Then, together with (4.3), we get
(BS1 −BS2)(x)− (BS1 − BS2)(z) ≤ 2(1− δπ(A))||S1 − S2||.
Now by the definition of the quotient norm (3.5)
||Π(BS1 − BS2)|| ≤ (1− δπ(A))||S1 − S2||.
So we obtain
||B˜S˜1 − B˜S˜2|| ≤ (1− δπ(A))||S˜1 − S˜2||.
Theorem 4.2 (On the average cost). If (4.1) holds, then there exists a unique
λ ∈ R and a function S∗ ∈ Cb(X), unique up to equivalence (i.e. S˜
∗ = Π(S∗)
is unique), such that
B(S∗) = λ+ S∗. (4.4)
Moreover, for every S ∈ Cb(X),
||BTS − Tλ|| ≤ ||S∗||+ ||S∗ − S|| (4.5)
lim
T→∞
BTS
T
= λ (4.6)
and, for every S˜ ∈ C˜b(X),
||B˜T S˜ − S˜∗|| ≤ (1− δπ(A))T ||S˜ − S˜∗||. (4.7)
Proof. First, by the contraction property (4.2) of the operator B˜ on C˜b(X)
and the contraction principle (i.e. Banach fixed point theorem), the operator
B˜ has a unique fixed point in C˜b(X). Namely, there exists a unique S˜
∗ ∈
C˜b(X) such that
B˜S˜∗ = S˜∗. (4.8)
Consequently, there exists a λ ∈ R and a function S∗ ∈ Cb(X), unique up to
equivalence such that (4.4) holds.
Next, we shall prove (4.5). On one hand, by (4.4) and (3.3)
BTS∗ = BT−1(S∗ + λ) = BT−2(S∗ + 2λ) = · · · = Tλ+ S∗
and together with the triangle inequality, for any S ∈ Cb(X), we get
||BTS − BTS∗|| = ||BTS − Tλ− S∗|| ≥ ||BTS − Tλ|| − ||S∗||. (4.9)
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On the other hand, by (3.4), we have,
||BTS −BTS∗|| ≤ ||BT−1S −BT−1S∗|| ≤ · · · ≤ ||S − S∗||. (4.10)
By combining (4.9) and (4.10), we have
||BTS − Tλ|| − ||S∗|| ≤ ||S − S∗||
which clearly gives the inequality (4.5).
Equation (4.6) is implied by (4.5) by passing to the limit T →∞,
0 ≤ lim
T→∞
||BTS − Tλ||
T
≤ lim
T→∞
||S∗||+ ||S − S∗||
T
= 0
as the functions S and S∗ are all bounded functions. Equation (4.6), in turn,
implies the uniqueness of λ in (4.4).
Further, for every S˜ ∈ C˜b(X), by (4.8) we have
||B˜T S˜ − S˜∗| =||B˜(B˜T−1S˜)− B˜(B˜T−1S˜∗)||
≤(1− δπ(A))||B˜T−1S˜ − B˜T−1S˜∗||
≤ · · ·
≤(1− δπ(A))T ||S˜ − S˜∗||
which completes the proof.
Remark 4.3. The unique λ in (4.4) can be interpreted as the average cost
of player 1 from the long time Markov game.
Now we are ready for the first turnpike theorem on the set of opti-
mal strategies. Here we introduce some notations. Denote by E(x, S) =
{(u(x), v(x))} the set of pairs of optimal (equilibrium) strategies (u(x), v(x))
of (3.2) for any S ∈ Cb(X). Let E(S) = ∪x∈X{E(x, S)} be the set of pairs of
optimal (equilibrium) strategies with final cost function S ∈ Cb(X). In par-
ticular, the family E(S∗) contains the sets of the stationary strategies in the
game and E(BT−tS) is that the family of the sets of optimal (equilibrium)
strategies at the step t of a T -step game with final cost function S ∈ Cb(X).
Theorem 4.4 (Early turnpikes on the set of strategies). Let (4.1) hold.
Assume the set-valued function E(·) is continuous at least at the point S =
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S∗. Then for an arbitrary neighbourhood U(E(S∗)) of the set E(S∗), there
exists an M ∈ N such that if T > M , then for any S ∈ Cb(X)
E(BT−tS) ⊂ U(E(S∗))
for all t < T −M .
Remark 4.5. The continuity of the set-valued function E(·) is in the sense
of Hausdorff metric. The property that E(·) is continuous at the point S =
S∗ has been used and discussed in many places. For example, in [39], this
property is called the sensitivity property for a control law.
Proof. By (4.7), we have for any fixed T
B˜T−tS˜ → S˜∗ for large enough T − t.
By the assumption that E(S) depends continuously on S around S∗, we have
E(B˜T−tS˜)→ E(S˜∗) for large enough T − t.
So there exists an M ∈ N, such that
E(B˜T−tS˜) ⊂ U(E(S˜∗)), t < T −M
which completes the proof.
Remark 4.6. This theorem states that , in a sufficiently large T -step game
with an arbitrary final cost function S ∈ Cb(X), the optimal strategies at steps
t < T −M must be close to the stationary strategies E(S∗) and diverge away
from the turnpike only near to the end of the game. Thus this is a stochastic
competitive control version of the early turnpike as defined in [67].
Further, with additional assumptions on the set of optimal strategies and
on the equilibrium transitions, we shall show that, in a long-time game, if
the game is carried out with optimal strategies, then, apart from short initial
and final periods of time, the distributions of its position on the state space
must be very close to the stationary distribution. Let ‖ ·‖TV denote the total
variation norm of measures.
Theorem 4.7 (Middle turnpike on the (distribution of) state space). Let
(4.1) hold. Assume the set-valued function E(S) is continuous at least at
the point S = S∗ and, for each state x ∈ X, the set E(x, S∗) contains only
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one pair of optimal strategies (u∗(x), v∗(x)). Let Q∗ = {q∗(x)}x∈X denote the
stationary distribution for the stationary Markov chain defined on the state
space X by the unique pair of optimal strategies (u∗(x), v∗(x)). Assume also
that the equilibrium transition probabilities depend locally Lipschitz continu-
ous on S around S∗, i.e. that there exists a constant k such that,
||P (u(x), v(x), x, ·)−P (u∗(x), v∗(x), x, ·)||TV ≤ k||S−S
∗||, ∀x ∈ X (4.11)
where (u, v) ∈ E(x, S) and S is sufficiently close to S∗. Then for each ǫ > 0,
there exists an M ∈ N such that for each T -step game, T > 2M , with
terminal cost S ∈ Cb(X) of player 1, we have
||Q(t)−Q∗||TV < ǫ
for all t ∈ [M,T−M ], where Q(t) = {q(x, t)}x∈X and q(x, t) is the probability
that the process is in a state x ∈ X at time t if the game is carried out with
the optimal strategies.
Remark 4.8. In other words, q∗(x) is the mean amount of time that each
sufficiently long game with optimal strategies spends in position x.
Proof. From (4.11), together with Lemma 4.1, we have
||Pt(x, ·)− P
∗(x, ·)||TV ≤ kǫ
T−t||S − S∗||
where ǫ = 1−δπ(A), Pt(x, ·) is the transition probability arising from optimal
strategies (u(x), v(x)) at time t ≤ T with terminal payoff S and P ∗(x, ·) =
P (u∗(x), v∗(x), x, ·).
Let Ψt and Ψ
∗ denote linear operators on the set of measures
(Ψtµ)(dx) :=
∫
µ(dz)Pt(z, dx) and (Ψ
∗µ)(dx) :=
∫
µ(dz)P ∗(z, dx)
so that
||Ψt −Ψ
∗|| = sup
||µ||=1
∫
µ(dz) (Pt(z, dx)− P
∗(z, dx))
≤ kǫT−t||S − S∗||.
The state distribution at time t can be estimated by
Q(t) =Ψt · · ·Ψ1Q(0)
=(Ψ∗ + ξt) · · · (Ψ
∗ + ξ1)Q(0)
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with ξj ≤ kǫ
T−j , where Q(0) is the initial state distribution. Since
||Ψt · · ·Ψ1 − (Ψ
∗)t||
=||(Ψt −Ψ
∗)Ψt−1 · · ·Ψ1 +Ψ
∗(Ψt−1 −Ψ
∗)Ψt−2 · · ·Ψ1
+ · · ·+ (Ψ∗)t−1(Ψ1 −Ψ
∗)||
≤k
[
ǫ(T−t) + ǫ(T−t+1) + · · ·+ ǫ(T−1)
]
≤kǫ(T−t)(1 + ǫ+ ǫ2 + · · · )
=
k
1− ǫ
ǫ(T−t) ≤
k
1− ǫ
ǫM1
for t < T −M1, M1 ∈ N, we have
||Q(t)− (Ψ∗)tQ(0)||TV ≤ ǫ1
for t < T − M1, where ǫ1 can be made arbitrary small by choosing large
enough M1 ∈ N.
By the theorem on the convergence of probability distribution in homo-
geneous Markov chains to a stationary distribution, it follows that for each
ǫ2 > 0 there exists an M2 ∈ N such that
||(Ψ∗)tQ(0)−Q∗||TV ≤ ǫ2, t > M2.
Let M = max{M1,M2}. If T > 2M , the intersection of the sets [1, T −M1]
and [M2,∞) is non-empty. Then we have
||Q(t)−Q∗||TV ≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2 ∀t ∈ [M,T −M ]
which completes the proof.
5 Concluding remarks
We have considered a two-person zero-sum Markov game with a general Borel
state space and the modelling is formulated in the discrete time setting. With
the Bellman operator defined by (3.2), we have proved the convergence of the
long time average cost (reward) of the game and turnpike theorems on the
set of optimal strategies and on the state space are proved. We would like
to mention that these results still hold under the corresponding continuous
time setting by discretising, that is by looking at a continuous time game as
the limit of games with discrete times.
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Notice that in our modelling, at each step, we can observe the exact posi-
tion of this game. But it often happens that one has to take into account not
only the exact position, but also, the state distribution (say, its variance of
volatility). This leads to the turnpike properties for measure-valued Markov
games, see [52, 53, 54]. For example, the final cost function may be any
continuous function on a measure space and the stochastic transition kernels
may depend on the state distribution. We shall develop results under this
more general setting in future work.
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